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ABSTRACT 
Social and political bots have a small but strategic role in 
Venezuelan political conversations. These automated scripts 
generate content through social media platforms and then 
interact with people. In this preliminary study on the use of 
political bots in Venezuela, we analyze the tweeting, 
following and retweeting patterns for the accounts of 
prominent Venezuelan politicians and prominent 
Venezuelan bots. We find that bots generate a very small 
proportion of all the traffic about political life in Venezuela. 
Bots are used to retweet content from Venezuelan politicians 
but the effect is subtle in that less than 10 percent of all 
retweets come from bot-related platforms. Nonetheless, we 
find that the most active bots are those used by Venezuela’s 
radical opposition. Bots are pretending to be political 
leaders, government agencies and political parties more than 
citizens. Finally, bots are promoting innocuous political 
events more than attacking opponents or spreading 
misinformation. 
FROM SOCIAL BOTS TO POLITICAL BOTS 
It is widely acknowledged that several regimes employ both 
people and bots to engage in political conversations online. 
The Chinese, Iranian, and Russian, governments employ 
their own social-media experts and pay small amounts of 
money to large numbers of people to generate pro-
government messages.[1] 
The word “botnet” comes from combining “robot” with 
“network,” and it describes a collection of programs that 
communicate across multiple devices to perform some task. 
The tasks can be simple and annoying, like generating spam. 
The tasks can be aggressive and malicious, like choking off 
exchange points or launching denial-of-service attacks. Not 
all are developed to advance political causes. Some seem to 
have been developed for fun or to support criminal 
enterprises, but all share the property of deploying messages 
and replicating themselves.[2] There are two types of bots: 
legitimate and malicious. Legitimate bots, like the Carna 
Bot, which gave us our first real census of device networks, 
generate a large amount of benign tweets that deliver news 
or update feeds. Malicious bots, on the other hand, spread 
spam by delivering appealing text content with the link-
directed malicious content. 
Botnets are created for many reasons: spam, DDoS attacks, 
theft of confidential information, click fraud, cyber-
sabotage, and cyber-warfare.[3] Many governments have 
been strengthening their cyberwarfare capabilities for both 
defensive and offensive purposes. In addition, political 
actors and governments worldwide have begun using bots to 
manipulate public opinion, choke off debate, and muddy 
political issues. 
Social bots are particularly prevalent on Twitter.[4] They are 
computer-generated programs that post, tweet, or message of 
their own accord. Often bot profiles lack basic account 
information such as screen names or profile pictures. Such 
accounts have become known as “Twitter eggs” because the 
default profile picture on the social-media site is of an egg. 
While social-media users get access from front-end 
websites, bots get access to such websites directly through a 
mainline, code-to-code connection, mainly through the site’s 
wide-open application programming interface (API), 
posting and parsing information in real time. 
Bots are versatile, cheap to produce, and ever evolving. 
“These bots,” argues Rob Dubbin, “whose DNA can be 
written in almost any modern programming language, live 
on cloud servers, which never go dark and grow cheaper by 
day.”[5] Unscrupulous internet users now deploy bots 
beyond mundane commercial tasks like spamming or 
scraping sites like eBay for bargains. Bots are the primary 
applications used in carrying out distributed denial-of-
service and virus attacks, email harvesting, and content theft. 
A subset of social bots are given overtly political tasks and 
the use of political bots varies across regime types. 
DATA, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND POLITICS IN 
LATIN AMERICA 
Twitter has become a powerful communication tool during 
many kinds of crises, political or otherwise. When the drug 
war erupted neither the drug lords nor the government 
expected a network of real-time war correspondents to 
spring up to report battles between police and gangs. 
Tweeting certainly didn’t stop the drug war. But it helped 
people to cope. We can’t measure how important the sense 
of online community provided by active tweeting can be in 
the first few weeks of a crisis, both in providing moral 
support and in keeping people safe. A few citizens rise to the 
occasion, curating content and helping to distinguish good 
information from bad.[2, p. 22], [6] 
These are other examples of how people create their own 
public alert systems. When Hurricane Sandy hit Santiago, 
Cuba, information didn’t come from the state; it came from 
the country’s independent (illegal) journalists. Text 
messages about serious damage and the loss of life circulated 
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among people a day before state media tried to bring citizens 
up to date. 
However, governments and political leaders across Latin 
America are getting more adept at using digital media and 
managing data. And journalists in the region are getting 
better at covering data politics as a public issue. In March 
2012 the Miami Herald reported that sensitive data about 
Venezuelans was being kept in Cuba.[7] Government 
databases, voting records, citizenship and intelligence 
records, and more were being stored in server farms outside 
Havana. To an outsider, it might be strange to think of 
Havana as a more secure city than Caracas, but of greater 
importance is the privacy issue of having data about a 
country’s citizens was being transported out of country. 
Data-mining firms in Texas maintain detailed profiles of 
Argentina’s citizens, and there is a global trade in data about 
people from all corners of the world.[8] 
What is important in the Cuba-Venezuela connection is that 
the government did not choose to house important 
information with a firm or in a place that has good security 
or stable infrastructure. Data warehouses across the United 
States and Europe have such features. The network ties 
between Venezuela and Cuba are so strong that they 
overcame any technical logic to file storage. The data did not 
simply need to be stored, it needed to be stored with political 
compatriots that would share the same expectations of 
surveillance and social control. So while bad analysis of big 
data is a real danger, there is also a proven capacity for big 
data analysis and sophisticated bot use by authoritarian 
governments. 
During recent political campaigns in Mexico, a political 
party paid close to $80,000 USD to a marketing company to 
create 22 Twitter trending topics in their favor, and a similar 
amount for promoting 576 tweets.[9] Bots tweeting from 
Venezuela were very active in the campaign by the Podemos 
party, a relatively newly established left-wing party in Spain, 
against their rival party Ciudadanos, a centrist party that has 
been dubbed the “Podemos of the right,” during the recent 
national elections.[10] 
While only a small number of Venezuelans use Twitter, the 
people who do use it tend to be urban, wealthy, young, and 
engaged in the political life of the country.[11] Around 14 
percent of the active internet users in Venezuela also use 
Twitter—one of the highest Twitter adoption rates of any 
country. Furthermore, a recent study on global mobile trends 
from the Pew Research center reveals that more Venezuelans 
than any other people in Latin American share views about 
politics on social media. Venezuelans were the most likely 
to say that they learned someone’s political beliefs were 
different than what they thought based on something they 
said in social media.[12] 
Unfortunately, there is growing evidence that the country’s 
social media conversations are being cluttered by political 
bots. A Freedom House report on the global state of freedom 
on the internet in 2013 acknowledged that “[r]ather than 
engaging in significant censorship, the [Venezuelan] 
government is making substantial use of social media 
platforms to propagate its point of view and counter political 
opposition”.[13] A Twiplomacy study found that Nicolas 
Maduro is the third most effective world leader on Twitter 
(as measured by average number of retweets per tweet), but 
noted that it was odd that his tweets were favorited ten times 
less, a discrepancy that could suggest that bots are doing the 
majority of this retweeting.[14] Last summer, Cuban 
dissident Yusnaby Perez revealed that as many as 2,500 of 
the accounts retweeting President Maduro were bots.[15] In 
recent years, the Twitter accounts of opposition candidates, 
government critics and activists have been hijacked and used 
to disseminate pro-government messages.[13] This has gone 
both ways: in response to these hackings, there have been 
retaliation hacking campaigns by online activists against 
pro-government Twitter accounts.[13] 
Other claims come directly from politicians. In early April 
of this year, President Maduro charged that Twitter in 
Venezuela was being managed (and manipulated) by his 
political enemies in the media.[16] In the past, Maduro has 
been quoted as saying “If lies come through Twitter we are 
going to strike back through Twitter.”[13] In 2010, Diosdado 
Cabello, Speaker of the National Assembly and prominent 
member of the ruling party, was quoted saying that that “The 
opposition believes itself to be the owner of social 
networking,” and claimed they would “assault social 
networks to counter the views expressed by [their] 
opponents.”[17] 
SAMPLING AND METHOD 
The leading and opposition groups in Venezuela are active 
on Twitter, and politicians on both sides frequently use 
Twitter to address each other and their supporters. We 
identified six individual politicians who are particularly 
active Twitter users: four from the ruling United Socialist 
Party of Venezuela (PSUV), one from the opposition 
Democratic Unity roundtable (MUD), and one from the 
opposition Voluntad Popular (VP). 
From the governing PSUV we tracked: 
 @NicolasMaduro: Nicolás Maduro; 2.37 million 
followers. Currently the president of Venezuela, Maduro 
served under Hugo Chavez for several years as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (2006-2013) and Vice President (2012-
2013). 
 @dcabellor: Diosdado Cabello; 1.24 million followers. 
Cabello, a powerful figure in the Maduro administration, 
is the Speaker of the National Assembly of Venezuela and 
widely recognized as one of the strong men of late 
president Hugo Chavez.  
 @TareckPSUV: Tareck El Aissami; 849k followers. El 
Aissami is the governor of the state of Aragua, having 
served under Chávez as Interior and Justice Minister. 
Research conducted in Venezuela has suggested that the 
state government of Aragua has a particularly robust social 
media botnet strategy. 
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 @luislopezPSUV: Luis Lopez; 11k followers. Lopez is 
the Head of Health in the state of Aragua. 
From the opposition we tracked: 
 @hcapriles: Henrique Capriles Radonski; 5.23 million 
followers. Capriles is both the governor of the state of 
Miranda and the leader of the Democratic Unity 
roundtable (MUD), a coalition group of opposition parties. 
He ran as the opposition candidate against Hugo Chávez 
in 2012 and Nicolás Maduro in 2013, losing in 2013 by 
only a narrow (and hotly contested) margin. 
 @leopoldolopez: Leopoldo López; 3.54 million 
followers. Former mayor of Chacao, and leader of the 
opposition group Voluntad Popular (VP), López was 
arrested in February 2014 for his involvement in the 
protests that occurred that month. Although he remains in 
jail, his Twitter account is now managed by his wife and 
supporters, and remains active. 
While our purpose is to discern whether and how bots are 
being used to boost the messages of the ruling party, we 
included two accounts from the opposition in order to 
provide comparison points. 
Our goal was to shed light on whether online bots worked 
for the Venezuelan government. We considered we might be 
able to detect possible bots by analyzing who is retweeting 
politicians content. We specifically examine the type of 
online platforms that people use to retweet as bots are known 
to use specific application to massively spread content. 
Our research proceeded in three stages 
 We collected all of the tweets generated by the main 
Venezuelan politicians. 
 For each of their tweets we collected the list of people who 
had retweeted the content. 
 We studied what platform each account used to retweet the 
content. 
We also study the online profile of the people who retweeted 
the most content from politicians, particularly the 
individuals who used suspicious bot related platforms for 
their retweets. 
Tracking bots—especially political bots—requires careful 
understanding of how the design features of platforms may 
constrain the sampling strategy. It is impossible to report the 
total number of bots engaged in Venezuelan politics. Twitter 
itself only allows researchers to get information from the 100 
most recent retweets.[18] We assume that accounts using 
platforms like Botize or Masterfollow are bots because that 
is what those platforms are designed to do, and the accounts 
that use those platforms all retweet the same content at the 
same time. The Botize service advertises itself as a way to 
create your own bot and tasks after you have set up your own 
Twitter account.[19], [20] Rather trying to determine which 
specific tweet was generated by a bot we look at the type of 
platform used to retweet or create a tweet to determine the 
probability that message was bot-generated. Many of the 
accounts that are driven by a bot use bot-dominated 
platforms and normal platforms for tweeting activity. 
Indeed, many of the accounts that we identified as likely 
being bots have since been suspended by Twitter—the 
company also considered them to be bots. 
We collected all of the tweets from the list of politicians for 
2015 and the entire list of retweets for 2015. Note that 
Twitter API only allows for the collection of 100 latest 
retweets for a given tweet. 
With these sampling caveats in mind, we captured and 
analyzed all of the tweets these key politicians generated 
between January 1st and May 31st 2015. We collected a total 
of 11,796 tweets. We then collected the retweet information 
of a subset of these tweets—who was retweeting, and 
platforms used to retweet. This process generated 205,077 
retweets. Some 2 percent of these all of these retweets were 
bot generated. For some politicians as much as 5 percent of 
their retweet traffic comes from bots. 
After taking an initial sample of tweets from our list of 
politicians, retweet information from the top 15 percent of 
most frequent retweets was gathered over the course of 
several days following each initial Tweet—amounting to 
1,721 Tweets. Twitter also restricts how many queries 
researchers can make each hour so we took the most 
aggressive approach possible in collecting the retweet 
information of the most noteworthy tweets. The 
programming was done in python using the Tweepy API, 
which facilitates accessing and processing twitter data. 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The flow of bot generated traffic may vary during political 
crises. But for our sample period, Table 1 presents the 
primary platforms for retweeting, and Table 2 details the 
percent of each accounts’ retweets generated by bots. High 
profile accounts will always capture the attention of a small 
portion of bots, but with a closer look at the types of bots 
involved we can say more about how automated scripts are 
used to amplify political messaging—even when there is no 
political crisis. 
Table 1: Percent of Retweets by Venezuelan Politicians, by 
Platform, 2015 
Platform Percent 
Twitter android 34.3 
Twitter Webclient 30.3 
Twitter iPhone 14.9 
Twitter Blackberry 11.9 
Tweetdeck 2.3 
Botize 1.7 
Mobileweb, 0.9 
Twitter for Windows Phone 0.8 
Twitter for Websites 0.4 
Ubersocial 0.3 
Masterfollow 0.2 
 
First, we mapped out the range of platforms being used to 
retweet the content generated by the sample of politicians.  
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Table 2: Percent of Retweets from Bot Platforms, By 
Politician, 2015 
Politician, Party, Account Percent of Retweets Generated by Bots 
Tareck El Aissami, Governing PSUV, 
@tareckpsuv 
0.4 
Henrique Capriles, Opposition DU, 
@hcapriles 
0.5 
Diosdado Cabello, Governing PSUV, 
@dcabellor 
0.7 
Luis Lopez, Governing PSUV, 
@luislopezpsuv 
1.9 
Nicolás Maduro, Governing PSUV, 
@nicolasmaduro 
2.0 
Leopoldo López, Opposition VP, 
@leopoldolopez 
4.4 
 
We identified 11 platforms and found that approximately 38 
percent of the retweets were generated by web browsers, and 
62 percent were generated by mobile phone based apps. Of 
course, the majority of the politicians’ content was retweeted 
by mobile phone applications, such as “Twitter for 
Android”, “Twitter for Blackberry”, or “Twitter for iPhone” 
because the country has one of the highest rates of mobile 
phone diffusion in Latin America.[21] 
What is particularly fascinating is that people also used bot 
platforms, such as Botize or MasterFollow, to retweet. These 
are particular services define themselves has popular free 
services which can execute actions automatically. 
Altogether these kinds of platforms were used for less than 
5 percent of all the retweets. 
 
Bots Used Mostly By Radical Opposition 
 The use of bot platforms varied significantly by politician. 
For instance, Nicholas Maduro was the only politician who 
received retweets from the platform called Retuitear al 
Presidente (Retweet the President). Some politicians were 
also retweeted by bot platforms more than others. For 
instance, less than 1 percent of Diosdado Cabello’s 
(@dcabellor) content was retweeted by bot platforms, 
whereas bot platforms altogether generated almost 7 percent 
of the retweets of tweets coming from the account of 
Leopoldo Lopez (@leopoldolopez). 
Many of the bots that present themselves as official political 
candidates do so for specifically for a more radical 
opposition party (VP) rather than the dominant party 
(PSUV) or the more mainstream opposition party (MUD). In 
other countries it is the governing party that uses bots most 
aggressively, but in Venezuela the opposite is true. There has 
been relatively little bot activity, relative to the PSUV and 
VP, from the coalition of opposition Democratic Unity Party 
led by Capriles, the candidate who gave Maduro a serious 
run for his money in the 2013 election. At the same time, it 
is the VP whose leaders have been most aggressively 
targeted--and jailed—by the current government. 
More Bot Political Leaders than Bot Citizens 
We decided to profile the suspicious retweeters by 
inspecting the online Twitter profile of the top 10 percent 
most active retweeters who used a bot platform at least once. 
We identify two kinds of bot profiles. 
Bots Pretending to Be Government, Parties and Politicians. 
These bot accounts presented themselves as real political 
organizations, government offices, and real politicians, 
usually affiliated with the Voluntad Popular party. Many VP 
Figure 1: Platforms for Retweeting Venezuelan Politicians, Disaggregated by Politician, 2015 
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bot accounts represent themselves not as political 
candidates, but as VP party branches in different states and 
cities—they are branches of a party organization. For 
example, @VP_Carabobo is the account for the state of 
Carabobo, whereas @VPBejuma is the account for the small 
town of Bejuma in the state of Carabobo. Figure 2 is a 
screenshot of the @VPDiegoIbarra account page, which is 
an account that represents the municipality of Diego Ibarra 
in the state of Carabobo. All of these bots used the Botize 
platform to retweet content. In addition, most of their 
usernames had embedded in them the term “VP”--the initials 
of the Voluntad Popular party. 
For example, @VPBejuma has the consistent behavior of a 
bot-driven account. We believe the account exhibits 
suspicious bot-like behavior because it used the Botize 
interface to retweet over 100 tweets from other politicians. 
The account appears to only use Botize to retweet content, 
and Tweet Deck for its own tweets. Interestingly, we found 
that many such accounts use one particular bot platform, 
never multiple platforms, and that these bot accounts were 
only filled with tweets about Venezuelan politics. These bots 
do not retweet at the same time nor do they retweet the same 
content. But they primarily use bot related platforms for their 
retweets. 
The account @VPBejuma reveals bot-like behavior more 
than @VPCarabobo because it almost exclusively retweets 
other notable VP accounts.  And Figure 1 demonstrates that 
@VPDiegoIbarra has very similar tweeting behavior:  
thousands of tweets, following few other accounts, small 
number of followers. Yet this seems to be more a media 
strategy—creating localized accounts for VP branches on 
the part of the VP—rather than a bot planted by the PSUV 
to make the VP look bad. In contrast, @VPCarabobo tweets 
for a whole state, and thus might be more manually 
controlled than accounts for single municipalities such as 
@VPDiegoIbarra and @VPBejuma. 
Bots Pretending to be Citizens. 
We identified bots that were tasked with presenting 
themselves as somewhat average citizens. Each account 
identified a unique username, they didn’t all include special 
patterns of initials as the bot politicians, and they didn’t 
parrot the names of political parties or government offices. 
In addition, these citizen bots used a different set of 
platforms for retweeting. The primary platforms for bot 
citizens include TweetDeck (43 percent of bot citizens), 
MasterFollow (26 percent), and the main Twitter Web Client 
(25 percent). These Bot Citizens presented themselves very 
mechanically:  many of them retweeted the exact same 
content at the exact same time. The content was exclusively 
related to Venezuelan politics. For example, Figure 3 offers 
additional screenshots:  @salud_dia1 and @elchinito_pon 
retweeted the same content at the exact same time. 
Bots for Impression Management 
Bots have been used in many ways by political actors around 
the world. They have been used to attack opponents, choke 
off hashtags, and promote political platforms. During this 
sample period however we found that social media bots were 
used mostly for impression management. Social media bots 
are used for impression management in terms of a) spreading 
news about how leaders perform in public events within 
Venezuela and b) building the reputation that leaders are 
international statesmen in conversation with the leadership 
of other countries. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is no secret that governments and political actors now 
make use of social robots or bots—automated scripts that 
Figure 2: Screenshot of Bot Account @VPDiegoIbarra 
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produce content and mimic real users. Fake social media 
accounts now spread pro-governmental messages, beef up 
web site follower numbers, and cause artificial trends. Bot-
generated propaganda and misdirection has become a 
worldwide political strategy. 
Robotic lobbying tactics have been deployed in several 
countries: Russia, Mexico, China, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Azerbaijan, Iran, Bahrain, 
South Korea, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco. Indeed, 
experts estimate that bot traffic now makes up over 60 
percent of all traffic online—up nearly twenty percent from 
just two years ago. 
Venezuelan government leaders also use bots to extend their 
social media impact. The use of bots in political conversation 
is particularly problematic given the number of real social 
media users incarcerated for using platforms like Twitter for 
political speech.[22] They have gone from simply padding 
follower lists to retweeting volumes of their own 
commentary and announcements. In this analysis, we find 
that bots generate a very small proportion of all the traffic 
about political life in Venezuela. Repeating this sample 
collection and study method in a time of political crisis or 
during an active election campaign would likely reveal 
different levels of bot prevalence and impact. 
Bots are used to retweet content from Venezuelan politicians 
but the effect is subtle in that less than 10 percent of all 
retweets come from bot-related platforms. First, we find that 
the most active bots are those used by Venezuela’s radical 
opposition. Second, bots are pretending to be political 
leaders, government agencies and political parties more than 
citizens. Finally, bots are promoting innocuous political 
events more than attacking opponents or spreading 
misinformation. 
  
Figure 3: Screenshot of Bot Accounts @salud_dia1 and @elchinito_pon Retweet Incident 
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